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Descartes's Dreams 375
Baillet, for example, apologizes for the dreams' "enthusiasm" immediately after he relates them, but he claims that he is merely following Descartes's own lead in the Olympica:
This last thought [regarding "the signal of the Spirit of Truth"] surely contained a bit of Enthusiasm, and it might incline us to believe that M. Descartes had been drinking the evening before he went to bed.... But he assures us that he had passed the evening and all the preceding day in complete sobriety, and that for three whole months he had drunk no wine. He adds that the Genie who had excited in him the enthusiasm which for several days he felt heating up his brain had predicted these dreams to him before his going to bed, and that the human mind had played no part in them. (I, 85; AT, X, 186) But what is the meaning of this "enthusiasm," which, as Baillet reports, was even used in the manuscript's dramatic opening sentence: "On 10
November 1619, filled with Enthusiasm, I discovered the foundations of an admirable science" (I, 51; AT, X, 179)? And why would the dreamer himself feel such a need to excuse the very dreams that, as Baillet reports in the next paragraph, "he judged the most important of his life," and in honor of which he even vowed to undertake a pilgrimage (I, 85-86; AT X, 186-87)? By the time Baillet comes to write, there is obviously much more at stake here than just drunkenness, for there seems to be a very real danger that the philosopher who (at the very least) is given credit for the founding of modem rationalism-the most "awake" of all philosophers, in other words-might have begun his career with a series of enthusiastic and therefore "irrational" dreams, in which in fact "the human mind had played no part." In other words the dreams' enthusiasm is troubling exactly because it appears to come from outside philosophy, and it is just this possibility which comes to threaten not only the foundation of the "method" but even the signature "Descartes." That is, the very phrase "Descartes's dreams" seems to be an oxymoron, and this is the dreams' essential challenge which can be traced in the virtually uninterrupted stream of readings that have been produced since Descartes's own century.
Leibniz, who read the Olympica when Descartes's papers were entrusted to him in the 1670s, accuses Baillet of having misunderstood what Descartes meant by "the foundations of an admirable science." Leibniz openly calls Descartes an "Enthusiast," implying that he was a member of a secret and heretical society such as the Rosicrucians.2 Baillet of course had gone to great lengths to defend Descartes and "Cartesianism" from just such a charge.3 Note for example the way that the Vie broaches the 2 Leibniz, "Remarques sur I'abrege de la vie de Mons. des Cartes," C. J. Gerhardt All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 376 Michael Keevak subject of the dreams themselves: Descartes "was fatigued to such an extent that a fire seized his brain, and he fell into a kind of enthusiasm which disposed his already dejected mind in such a way that it put him in a condition to receive the impressions of dreams and visions" (I, 81;
AT, X, 181). In other words Descartes's enthusiasm is always given a place in a particular sequence of causes and effects that will supposedly help to "explain" it. One can see the same process at work in Baillet's version of the Olympica's opening sentence, which is conveniently set off from the rest of his "translation" by means of italics: "He tells us that on 10 November 1619, having gone to bed completely full of his enthusiasm, and completely occupied with the thought of having discovered on that day the foundations of an admirable science, he had three consecutive dreams in a single night, which he imagined could only have come from above" (I, 81; AT, X, 181). Just as he claims that Descartes merely "fell"
into a state of enthusiasm that only "disposed" him to "receive" the dreams, Baillet's reception of Descartes's text essentially attempts to account for the dreams by also making that enthusiasm specifically precede them in a way that may not even be substantiated by Descartes's Latin (that is, is the phrase "on that day" Baillet's invention?). Modem critics generally accept Baillet's version of this sequence unquestioningly. As
Henri Gouhier (probably the single most influential authority on the dreams and their importance for the history of philosophy) has written, "the discovery of the 'foundations of an admirable science' is the work of the daytime, not the night."4
Thus we can see that Baillet feels a remarkable desire to excuse the dreams even as he is merely "transcribing" them, and that desire became even more evident when he produced an abridged, one-volume "popular" version of the Vie in the following year. As Baillet now says, Descartes "had three consecutive dreams, but extraordinary enough for him to imagine that they could have come to him from above."5 Baillet's original emphasis on Descartes's conviction regarding the dreams' "source"-that their inspiration came from above (God) and not from below (Satan)6
is shifted in order to concentrate on the particularly powerful nature of the dreams themselves, which were "extraordinary enough" that they might well justify the dreamer's belief in their supernatural quality. At first there had been greater stress on the dreamer's judgment regarding the dreams, which is exactly what inspired so much derision in the seventeenth century in particular. Christian Huygens described the entire experience I Henri Gouhier, Essais sur Descartes (Paris, 1937), 288. as "a great weakness," and Pierre-Daniel Huet's 1693 parody of the episode claimed that the dreams were not "revelations from Heaven" at all but just "ordinary dreams" caused by tobacco or alcohol or melancholy.7
Despite Baillet's attempt to lay the blame on the power of the dreams themselves, in other words, he appears unable to give them a "cause" that is any more palatable. The most astonishing change in the Abrege is that it actually omits the dream-narrative altogether in favor of the following "summary":
He had three consecutive dreams, but extraordinary enough for him to imagine that they could have come to him from above. He thought he could perceive through their shadows the signs of a path which God had marked out for him for following His will in his choice of life, and in pursuit of the truth which was the cause of his uneasiness. But the spiritual and divine air that he pretended to
give to the explications he made of the dreams so powerfully bore the enthusiasm which he believed heated him up, that one might have been led to believe that his brain had been enfeebled, or that he had been drinking the evening before he went to bed. (Abrege, 45-46)
Descartes's own defense against inebriation remains, but the "spiritual and divine air" of his interpretations is of course Baillet's new and somewhat more tidy description of the dreams' "enthusiasm." Further, the addition of the term "uneasiness" (inquietudes), which one psychoanalytic reader has fruitfully translated as "anxieties,"8 may well be just another of Baillet's attempts to emphasize the overwhelming effect of the dreams'
"extraordinary" quality; but at the same time the term naturally leads us to consider the manifestations of Baillet's own anxiety when given the chance to rework the text.
Let us not forget, however, that it is really Descartes who suppresses his dreams when he chooses not to publish the Olympica, and he will also silence them in a far more interesting way in the Discourse on Method, in which almost twenty years later he will describe the very same period of his youth without mentioning the dreams at all. The Discourse is Descartes's own Abrege, in other words, and he will there omit the dreams and tell only the less "enthusiastic" story of the winter spent in the poele.
"I remained all day shut up alone in a stove-heated room," he writes, "where I had complete leisure to commune with my thoughts" (AT, VI, For not only must we read across the four hundred years that divide us from the text, but we must also "read back" to the dreams from a position of having already "awakened" from them ourselves, and it is just such an awakening that Descartes's dreams appear to produce in us.
Of course the synthesis that our own readings produce is merely another version or abridgment of the Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes, and thus every reader's desire, beginning with that of the dreamer himself, seems to be that the dreams become harmlessly "biographical. Although it is certainly true that any reader will misrepresent and misunderstand the dreams merely because they are being reconstructed (that is, remembered) from an "original," Gouhier so unconditionally accepts the text of the Vie that he actually deemphasizes the interpretations that Descartes himself is said to have made while "asleep": the only interpretation that can be taken seriously begins after the dreamer wakes up, and on this view not only is the third dream the most "real," but it is the only one that "deserves to attract our attention." Furthermore, since the first two dreams probably "return to his memory only at the moment when he has already interpreted the third one," the third dream "accords the privilege of being the nearest to the dream really dreamt"; and "the two others are reconstructions sufficiently remote from his wakeful consciousness and, indeed, arranged according to a 'key' that renders his memory a bit too intelligent." In brief "the order of the narrative" is the very opposite of "the real order, which is that of recollection"; or as one of Gouhier's reviewers has put it, "it is above all the posterior interpreta- but one wonders why it seems so important that Descartes specifically be sleeping but not dreaming, why even the possibility of a "dreaming interpretation" seems to be systematically avoided. Could Descartes even have doubted-which for Kennington is a thoroughly "rational" actwhile merely "dreaming"?
Like Baillet, Kennington seems distinctly uncomfortable about the possibility that Descartes might have begun to interpret his dreams before actually "waking up," and it is in this light that we must also understand the kind of assumptions that lie behind his conclusion:
[The dreams] compel us to consider the possibility that the work's every feature, dream as well as interpretation, is consciously intended. The Olympica would then be a deliberate, "poetic" construction, whose meaning is disclosed only to careful study-even if it was occasioned by actual dreams.
Again the "rational" and "awake" Descartes is being given precedence, but why would the dreams no longer be such a problem merely because they were "consciously intended," "deliberate," or "poetic"? Clearly one cannot "forget" the dreams merely by translating them into this kind of Indeed the dreams have never ceased to be a problem. In the texts of
Gouhier they bring about the danger of encroachment from wholly "nonphilosophical" domains such as Rosicrucianism and psychoanalysis. According to Gouhier, however, Descartes's own "retrospective" viewpoint actually wards off such troubling interpretations, for the dreamer supposedly does not consider or even remember the first two dreams until after the third one; and since he does not perceive the "supernatural" or "in- judging whether or not our own rationalizations were able to "succeed"?
What might Gouhier really be asking us to forget about the dreams?
In only five years, however, Gouhier's hypotheses will be unavoidably confronted by an intervention that will suddenly and permanently alter the nature of the whole debate-because it will come from Sigmund Freud. Freud became involved when a philosopher named Maxime Leroy wrote to him for a "consultation," and his response, which Leroy translated into French, first appeared in 1929. The letter was also printed in Precisely unlike Gouhier's reaction both to Rosicrucian speculations and to psychoanalytic readings, in other words, Baillet's Descartes is interested in members of the Brotherhood only because he is not anxious immediately to exclude them; and Baillet must go to some length to assure his readers that Descartes was in fact unable to discover a single confrere (not for nothing were they known as "The Invisibles"):
Descartes was not aware of those rules which prescribed that they never appear before anyone as they really were, that they should go in public dressed like other men, and that they must never reveal themselves either in their speech or in any other manner of living. One should thus not be surprised if all his curiosity and all his efforts to learn something about the matter should have proven useless. It was impossible for him to discover a single man who would declare himself part of this Brotherhood, or who could even be suspected of being so. He was almost to the point of placing the society at the level of chimeras.20 (I, 90; AT, X, 196)
Notice the way that Baillet wants to find a precise explanatory relationship between Descartes's youth, his dreams, and the chimerical; and when we see that the same is true of Leibniz's commentary,21 it is evident that the conjunction of these three elements is meant to provide a kind of youthful "excuse"" both for Descartes's enthusiastic interpretations and for the fact that he might have been interested in the Brotherhood in the first place.
By the time he comes to publish the Discourse and the Meditations (the "seriousness" of which, unlike the Olympica, is rarely disputed), the "grown up" and "awake" Descartes can merely shake off those chimerical dreams and lay behind him forever the embarrassingly naive attractions that they appear inevitably to suggest.
Thus Rosicrucianism fits into a scheme just as the dreams do, and Yet the difficulty is still in distinguishing a "pseudo-dream" from a "true" The fact that there is still some "core of genuine dreams" means that the dreams are, as Arnold continues, 'just as much properly dreamt, and therefore subconscious and involuntary, as they are reconstructed and voluntary"; but there seems to be no more hope than in Gouhier of distinguishing the "voluntary additions" from the "dreams really dreamt," and we once again end up in a position where the dreams are somehow dreamt as well as falsified.27 Arnold is absolutely correct when he writes that the dreams are "deformed" because they are "reconstructed"; but instead of beginning to apply this insight to the reader as well as to the dreamer, he takes another step backward ten years later when he concedes even further to the authority of Gouhier: "nothing permits us to think," he writes, "that ... Descartes had totally adhered to a doctrine regarding which he could not, according to Baillet, collect all the information he desired."28 Arnold has thus actually reverted to Baillet's position, that Descartes's Rosicrucian efforts simply "fail." Like Descartes himself, in other words, Arnold seems to have gathered up as much information as possible but to no avail, and it is tempting to claim that the debate has gradually "awakened" him as well. Yet he has certainly not awakened from the dreams in the sense that he has gradually learned to recognize the "truth" about the Rosicrucians, for on the contrary he has only come to see that the dreams' "reality" is not in fact identical to "the dream really dreamt." He has seen that the only thing "real" about the dreams is their essential unaccountability, and in this sense he has awakened not from the dreams but to them. His reading has provided no better "solution"; and because he has merely remembered the dreams all over again, which is exactly their address, the Rosicrucian question has uncovered an inability to reconcile not only Descartes with the Brother- But if we pause to ask whether psychoanalytic readers of the dreams have fared any better, it will be clear that they only participate in the same patterns because, despite the fact that they may be more interested in the psychological effect of the dreams upon the dreamer himself, such readers will also judge Descartes's experiences based on their biographical importance. Leroy's request, for example, really stems from a desire to glean a particular kind of information-regarding Descartes's sexualitythat he cannot obtain merely from "philosophy": Freud had suggested in passing that the melon in the first dream "might stand for a sexual picture which occupied the lonely young man's imagination" (SE, XXI, 204); and Leroy, who takes this to mean that Descartes "went through a crisis of conscience," senses that a great deal of information must also be hidden Freud understands that the dreams demand that they be characterized as "abstract, poetic, or symbolic" by the dreamer as well as by subsequent interpreters; but he obviously does not mean the same kind of "poetic"
"reinterpretation" that will later be suggested by Kennington, because
Freud's interest in the dreams is very different from many readers' curiosity about-again, to recall Kennington-what is "consciously intended."
It is remarkable that no reading of the dreams before Frangoise Meltzer's 1988 essay comments on what would appear to be an absolutely obvious fact, that in Baillet we are also told that the dreams had "come from above."
As Meltzer rightly points out, however, Freud's concept of Traume von oben is quite different, for Descartes's dreams come "from above" not in the sense that they are divinely inspired but because they are so closely related to his conscious, waking thought; "from above" in Freud is really from below-not from without (heaven) but from "within."34 Of course
Descartes himself understands that the dreams are closely related to his "wakeful" preoccupations, but Freud's attribution of the dreams' "cause"
is not at all the same:
The analysis of dreams of this kind usually leads us to the following position: we cannot understand the dream, but the dreamer-or the patient-can translate it immediately and without difficulty, given that the content of the dream is very close to his conscious thoughts. There then remains certain parts of the dream about which the dreamer does not know what to say: and these are precisely the parts which belong to the unconscious and which are in many respects the most interesting.
In the most favorable cases we explain this unconscious part with the help of the ideas which the dreamer has added to it.
This way ofjudging "dreams from above"-and this term must be understood in a psychological, not in a mystical [or "enthusiastic"?] sense-is the one to be . Is it Descartes's own reading that leads Freud to begin with the remark that the dreams were easier to interpret than he had imagined?
How else can we explain his response? He concludes swiftly by agreeing that the hindrances of the wind and the evil Genie represent "an internal conflict," and that the dreamer himself might be able to identify "the different figures who appear." He adds that the interpretation of the melon "is certainly not correct" and that "on the question of the portraits Descartes throws no light" (SE, XXI, 204). With these brief remarks Freud's letter (which covers a mere one and one-half pages) ends.
It is perhaps inevitable that Freud will seem to have "failed" to provide a solution for the dreams, and such dissatisfaction actually begins with Leroy himself: "Professor Freud," he writes, "examined these dreams in detail but was unable to explain them."35 Psychoanalytic readers have certainly come to Freud's defense, but to many of them he has failed as well, since on the one hand he does not pursue the "internal conflict" that he himself points out, and on the other hand Descartes's writings provide much more psychoanalytic evidence than Freud is willing to allow.36
One critic has speculated that because Freud himself suffered a "parallel conflict" in his own youth, he "felt anxiety over not being able to explain the dream." Another agrees that "one cannot help feeling that some resistance-mechanism was awakened in when receiving the dreams, to be "like" "Descartes"-the discoverer of "the foundations of an admirable science"? And is this desire, as Jacques
Maritain was perhaps the first to notice, not also the "dream" of Descartes in the sense that it is really his wish?" Not only does the dreamer succumb to all the same desires as the "wakeful" critic, but conversely it appears that critics succumb to a similar kind of wish-fulfillment when they read the dreams "like" Descartes by attempting to remember the method that still lies in his future. But what does it really mean to be "Descartes"?
For he is already a thoroughly "philosophical" and "wakeful" signature that addresses us from beyond the dreams, and it is this signature, not the "absurdity" of the conflict between the Genie and the Spirit of Truth, that guarantees that we will read the dreams "along the same lines" as the dreamer himself.
Clearly we must better understand what this kind of "imitation" entails. One psychoanalytic reader, Bertram Lewin, has suggested that Descartes himself "imitates" the dreams when he models his very method upon them, for in the dreams Descartes "is exactly what the observer is supposed to be and tries to be in the Cartesian system, that is, res cogitans, the pure and irrelevant spectator, the external observer." The dreams, however, are really "unsuccessful" because they fail to "preserve sleep in the face of intrusive bodily pain and discomfort" (the "real pain" he feels It is crucial that both these readings, which -are perhaps the most sophisticated we possess, want to reconcile Descartes and the dreams merely by repeating the "wakeful" claims of the method itself. But can we assume that we are awake when we try to accommodate the dreams?
Is it not true that just like Descartes we can think about the dreams whether or not we might "really" be asleep? And are our own readings not every bit as "extracorporeal" because they necessarily want to explain the dreams and thus to be an imitation of the cogito itself? We know that we awaken-just like Descartes-when we begin to interpret the dreams, but they do not merely encourage us to wake up and "imitate" them.
They dictate, rather, just as they had for the dreamer himself, the necessity of our own desire to find for the dream-thoughts a representation that "succeeds," the necessity for attempting "wakefully" to reconcile the dreams with a biography. Yet because any reader will essentially "repeat" the dreams in this way, the position of the "modem" critic is no more privileged or immune than that of the dreamer himself. Meltzer has begun to describe such a pattern of "censorship" and "recantation" in the dreams' reception, but she seems relatively unconcerned with the importance of her own "fear of failure to be original" and with the fact that she too might be guilty of the very same "blindness to a text" that she attributes to Freud.52 For "censorship" is nothing other than the address of the dreams themselves, and therefore we cannot exclude the "recantation" that will necessarily be involved in our own awakening as
well.
But what does "awakening" really mean? Although Marion subtitles his essay "the awakening of the philosopher," he does not seem to realize that it is just insofar as Descartes does awaken; and just insofar as the dreams will in fact be recalled (both by Descartes and by us), that the status of wakefulness can no longer remain either excluded or ignored.
For the fact that we awaken does not mean that we rise above the dreams or separate ourselves from them-not only because there is no such "dis- In Freud the dream concerns the corpse of a boy that has caught fire in the middle of the night when an old man, whose job it had been to watch over the candles that had been placed near the body, falls asleep, and the boy's father, asleep in the next room, dreams that his son calls out to him in order to wake him up: "Father, don't you see I'm burning?"
According to Freud the function of this dream is to prolong sleep-so that the father can continue to rest, so that the son may remain "alive"
for just a moment longer before his father must wake up to put out the fire-but Lacan also directs our attention to the fact that the old man continues sleeping despite the fact that the father wakes up, a detail which is itself a figure for the essential nonconfrontation between dreaming and awakening, between the real that is glimpsed in dreams and the reality that we encounter only once we wake up:
What is it that wakes the sleeper? Is it not, in the dream, another reality?. . . Is not the dream essentially, one might say, an act of homage to the missed realitythe reality that can no longer produce itself except by repeating itself endlessly, in some never attained awakening?53
Let us therefore ask what reality-which is precisely not "the dream really dreamt"-might "escape" when Descartes's dreams awaken us. Even though the dreams demand their own accommodation, do we not essentially miss something, just like Descartes, when we try to synthesize them-even though they call out to us like a burning child in the next room, or even though they are offered to us like a melon from a foreign land?
We necessarily feel a certain "pain" when the dreams elude us as well;
and although we too may want to jerk ourselves into the "wakeful" safety of a philosophical history, a biography, or even a parody, we can accomplish this only by alternately opening and closing our eyes to the of the dreams even before we are fully "awake," what we end up repeating is nothing more nor less than his awakening itself, and that awakening is our solution.
Yet this wakefulness is only a dream's "imitation," for it merely points toward a reality that we have in fact already missed. In other words the dreams address that part of us that remains asleep-that does not really encounter the dreams' reality but merely tries to "remember" it. Like
Descartes we both wake up and never do. We might well manage to make the dreams disappear into a synthesis, but like awakening itself-which is also a synthesis-the text that we produce only conceals. A dream is a child burning, Lacan writes, "a firebrand [that] of itself ... brings fire where it falls-and one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind US. "54 The address of Descartes's dreams ensures that we will repeat the dreamer's own attempt to accommodate the "foundations" that, once he is awake, have already escaped-but only because they have apparently been "forgotten." Even though the dreams may ineluctably call out to us as we read, the fact that they always pass us by as well may indicate that we too are doomed (like Freud) to "fail"; and yet it is exactly because the dreams will awaken us as well as the dreamer that our criticism-which remains "asleep," which has only an illusion of wakefulness-will also be fated to continue....
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